Reassessing the Significance of Firearms in Central Africa: The Case of North-Western Zambia to the 1920s by Macola, Giacomo
1 
 
Reassessing the Significance of Firearms in Central Africa: The Case of North-





University of Kent and Leiden University 
 
ABSTRACT: Based on a close examination of European travelogues and the evidence 
produced in the wake of the formulation of colonial gun policies, this article contends 
that the significance of firearms in Central Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century has been unduly played down in the existing literature. The first substantive 
section of the paper charts the movement of the gun frontier in nineteenth-century 
North-Western Zambia. It foregrounds the new technology’s economic and military 
applications, the means through which North-Western Zambians overcame some at least 
of its limitations and the plurality of innovative social roles they attributed to it. 
Successive sections centre on the pervasiveness of gun running in the early twentieth 
century and the implementation and profound social consequences of gun control laws. 
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The first professional historians of pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa thought a good deal 
about the impact of imported guns.
2
 Insofar as Central Africa is concerned, the 
consensus formed in these pioneering years was that the role of firearms in determining 
military and political outcomes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had probably 
been less significant than previously assumed. The most important statement to this 
effect was put forward by Andrew Roberts in a 1971 article that cautioned against 
attributing to firearms alone the general increase in violence that accompanied the 
westward advancement of the frontier of merchant capitalism and the long-distance 
trade in slaves and ivory. Having only become common in North-Eastern Zambia from 
the 1880s, firearms – Roberts argued – could not have influenced decisively earlier 
Bemba territorial expansion or altered in any profound way their military tactics based 
on shock attacks by swarms of spearmen. And even when the Bemba did acquire 
firearms in considerable quantities, the inferior quality of the muskets at their disposal 
militated against such weapons making a substantial contribution to elephant hunting or 
to Bemba resistance against better armed European forces.
3
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Commendable for steering clear of crude technological determinism, and 
appealing also to scholars bent on exploding racist assumptions about Africa’s pre-
colonial ‘heart of darkness’, these conclusions have stood the test of time and have been 
by and large corroborated by more recent studies of neighbouring areas and peoples. 
Joseph Miller, in particular, viewed the ‘unreliability’ of imported weapons – only a 
‘small percentage’ of which ‘survived the first few attempts to fire them’ – as one of the 
principal causes of the continuity in military hardware and organization that 
characterized the Angolan interior in the eighteenth century.
4
 In a similar vein, Achim 
von Oppen’s study of the pre-colonial economy of the upper Zambesi and Kasai region 
in the nineteenth century presents the ‘remarkably poor’ performance and ‘very limited 
durability’ of the lazarinas, the often untested flintlock muzzle-loaders that dominated 
the Ovimbundu-run trade between the Bihé plateau and the Zambesi headwaters, as 
indications that neither the reported disappearance of elephants in the area from ca. 




My starting point is that an emphasis on the technical shortcomings of the new 
weapons of destruction, and on the endurance of African military and hunting traditions 
vis-à-vis exogenous innovation, is hard to reconcile with Central Africa’s unquenchable 
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demand for European guns from the eighteenth century onwards and the fact that, as 
Miller himself is aware, firearms always constituted ‘the “very soul of commerce” in the 
exchange of people for goods with the Europeans.’6 If firearms had really been 
invariably inefficient, and therefore of only marginal economic and military 
significance, then it is not at all clear why the majority of Central Africans – whose 
‘political economy of rights over people’ could just as easily have been energized by 
exchanges of other foreign wares – consistently insisted on obtaining them throughout 
the era of the long-distance trade. This article’s main objective is to confront this 
unresolved contradiction by taking a fresh look at a range of fairly well-known, but 
rarely comprehensively cross-examined, nineteenth-century sources.  
To be sure, as has long been recognized, European travelogues are not free from 
problems. Coloured by the ‘racial, cultural and political shortcomings of their writers’, 
they are often myopic and Eurocentric in both tone and content.
7
 Nineteenth-century 
travel records tell us less than we would like to know – and what they tell us should not 
always be taken at face value. Yet, given the narrowly political perspective of formal 
oral traditions and the questionable reliability of focused oral interviews centring on so 
early a period, explorers’ diaries remain indispensable in providing data of a socio-
economic nature.
8
 Moreover, the travellers’ interest in military affairs, in general, and 
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guns, in particular, was not infrequently magnified by their backgrounds and, especially, 
by the hazardous circumstances in which they operated.  
When associated with the evidence produced in the wake of the formulation of 
colonial gun laws, the systematic study of European pre-colonial travelogues indicates 
that the importance of firearms in Central Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century has been unduly underrated in the specialist literature. For if they are examined 
through the perspectives of Science and Technology Studies, both sets of sources throw 
light on processes of technological appropriation that enabled Central Africans to 
minimize the deficiencies of imported weapons, using them profitably for both hunting 
and military purposes, and to infuse them with innovative social functions which were 
no less meaningful for being often at variance with those for which the weapons had 
originally been devised in their European settings. In reassessing the historical 
significance of guns in Central Africa, in other words, what Clapperton Mavhunga calls 
the specific ‘roles that Africans gave to firearms in contexts internal to their 
circumstances’ need to be explored alongside more predictable patterns of gun usage.9 
By so doing, this essay contends that the enthusiasm with which most North-Western 
Zambians responded to the advent of firearms from ca. 1800 was a consequence of both 
the adaptable nature of the new technology and the extent to which different groups 
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imbued it with different social meanings related to pre-existing interests and political 
structures.   
This article is subdivided into three sections. I begin by charting the nineteenth-
century expansion of the gun frontier in what would become colonial North-Western 
Rhodesia and the variegated processes of technological appropriation that underlay it.
10
 
The second section focuses on the early years of colonial rule; it foregrounds the 
survival of pre-colonial patterns of trade well into the twentieth century and the extent 
to which such continuities broadened and consolidated earlier forms of gun usage. 
Although colonial authorities had long posited a causal link between the ubiquity of 
firearms and the imperfect administrative normalization of substantial portions of 
North-Western Rhodesian territory, it was only in the early 1920s that they finally 
managed comprehensively to regulate African gun ownership and exchange. The 
implementation and far-reaching social consequences of this long-delayed policy form 
the subject of the article’s last section.  
 
The Gun Frontier in the Nineteenth Century 
 
The appearance of the gun along the present-day border between Zambia and Angola 
was inscribed in the broader processes of violent socio-economic change occurring in 
the area from the late eighteenth century. The advancing frontier of the Angolan slave 
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trade – driven mainly by Afro-Portuguese and Ovimbundu entrepreneurs (locally 
known as ‘Mambari’) – ushered in both new dangers and opportunities for both the 
small- and large-scale societies located on the southern periphery of what Jan Vansina 
has felicitously called the ‘Lunda commonwealth’.11 Further geopolitical 
transformations owed less to the peripheral workings of merchant capitalism than to the 
northern manifestations of the demographic dislocations of the South African 
‘Mfecane’. The most dramatic population movement to affect the region under 
discussion was that which led a group of Sotho-speaking migrants, the Kololo, to 
overrun the area’s most populous and complex polity, the Luyana or Lozi kingdom of 
the upper Zambezi floodplain and surrounding districts, in the early 1840s. It is to this 
latter area that we first turn in our attempt to chart the movement of the gun frontier 
through North-Western Zambia in the course of the nineteenth century.  
 
Slow beginnings in Barotseland 
Unlike Walima Kalusa, who has recently described Barotseland and the Caprivi Strip 
under the Kololo as awash with guns,
12
 I view Livingstone and Silva Porto’s overall 
paucity of references to modern weapons in the area, the ‘immense’ number of 
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elephants and other game near both Linyati and Sesheke and in the floodplain,
13
 the 
weapons’ abnormally high prices,14 and the attested poor marksmanship of the Kololo 
as indications that firearms were still rare in Barotseland in the 1850s.
15
 A few Kololo 
royals had some ‘wretched’ guns which they ‘wretchedly used’,16 and king Sekeletu’s 
opponent, Mpepe, the governor of Naliele, was given ‘a small cannon’ – or ‘a large 
blunderbuss to be mounted as a cannon’ – by Silva Porto in 1853.17 But stabbing and 
throwing spears and shields made of hides remained the dominant Kololo weapons 
throughout the decade – as is also borne out by the facility with which the trader 
Chapman conned Ponwane, ‘the headman of Linyati’, and other Kololo grandees in 
1853. Having been asked to repair some guns, he took advantage of their ‘ignorance’ of 
modern arms, ‘selected 5 of the easiest and repaired them for a tusk worth £15, at which 
rate [he] pocketed [his] pride.’18 It was this same ignorance on the part of the Kololo 
that apparently prompted the Tawana chief Letsholathebe to challenge Sekeletu’s 
authority by appropriating some of the latter’s ivory. Having recently acquired guns, 
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Livingstone explained, Letsholathebe now considered himself ‘more than a match’ for 
the less well armed Kololo.
19
  
To say that firearms were scarce in mid-nineteenth-century Barotseland is not to 
say that the Kololo resisted their introduction. The opposite, in fact, was true, for the 
conquerors of the Lozi were clearly keen on European weapons, the destructive 
potential of which they had experienced at the hands of Griqua musketeers at the start of 
their northward migration in the 1820s, and which they expected to use to contain the 
threat posed by Mzilikazi’s Ndebele.20 It is clearly significant that when he first met 
Livingstone’s party in 1851, Sebitwane, Sekeletu’s father and predecessor, was 
convinced that ‘our teaching was chiefly the art of shooting [...], and that by our giving 
him guns he would thereby procure peace [...].’21 Thus, the fact that Barotseland 
remained lightly armed until at least the early 1860s ought not to be ascribed to cultural 
opposition to military innovation on the part of assegai-wielding warriors. More simply, 
it was the result of the area’s comparatively late incorporation in Ovimbundu and Afro-
Portugese trading networks. This, in turn, was a consequence of the very specific 
requirements of the upper Zambesi floodplain’s political economy. The internal need for 
slaves for agricultural purposes and public works had led the last pre-Kololo Lozi king, 
Mulambwa Santulu, to shut his country to Mambari slave and gun traders in the early 
nineteenth century.
22
 It was only after the death of Mulambwa, the civil war that 
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followed it and the related Kololo conquest in the 1840s that Angolan traders returned 
in force to Barotseland, whose new rulers were now ready to export some war captives 
and, more importantly, ivory to the Ovimbundu plateau and, thence, the west coast. The 
ideal conditions faced by Silva Porto in early-1850s Bulozi, where ivory was cheap and 
plentiful and foreign wares scarce and expensive, prove that the long-distance trade was 
still in a relatively embryonic stage,
23
 and that the Kololo, for all their eagerness to 
experiment with foreign imports, had not yet managed to bridge the technological gap 
that separated them from some of their neighbours.  
 
Guns and Luvale men 
Spurned by the Lozi in the early part of the nineteenth century, Angolan traders had 
found more willing partners around the headwaters of the Zambesi. The first recorded 
trading visit to the Luvale (‘Lovar’), then living mainly along the middle Luena river, 
took place in 1794-1795. At the time, the people of Kakenge
24
 (‘Caquinga’) and 
Chinyama (‘Quinhama’) were already said to be ‘warlike’ (‘muito inclinados a 
Guerra’), but still only armed with ‘bows and arrows, spears and knives, and wooden 
shields.’25 They, confirmed a coeval anonymous report, had no firearms, ‘because they 
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[did] not know how to use them.’26 The situation, however, evolved rapidly, with gun 
imports increasing in direct proportion to slave and, from the 1830s, ivory and beeswax 
exports. By the early 1850s, the Luvale, not unlike their western neighbours, the 
Chokwe, had accumulated ‘many guns’,27 and they were among the most important 
suppliers of slaves to Angola.
28
 The then Kakenge boasted a long connection with 
Mambari traders, by whom, however, he was feared, for he and other ‘wild Luvale’ 




Numbers, however, tell only part of the story. What really matters are the uses to 
which the Luvale put their abundant muskets and the ways in which the latter interacted 
with pre-existing socio-economic structures and gender identities. The relationship 
between hunting and the spread of firearms among the Luvale was probably complex 
and dialectical: if well-developed autochthonous hunting traditions are very likely to 
have facilitated the rapid adoption of guns, firearms themselves must have transformed 
and strengthened such traditions. Technological considerations are significant, too. In 
comparison with the later breech-loaders, ‘the old muzzle-loaders’, Storey has recently 
argued with reference to South Africa, constituted an ‘adaptable and “flexible” 
technology’.30 Since  muskets were typically made from wrought iron (as opposed to 
steel), pre-existing iron-working skills – as the record clearly bears out for the Luvale’s 
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immediate neighbours, the Chokwe
31
 – could be so refined as to greatly prolong the 
lifespan of a damaged weapon and/or to keep a defective one in serviceable order. 
While gun-flints were manufactured locally,
32
 single-shot muzzle-loaders could also be 
loaded with most kinds of home-made ammunition and easily used in association with 
earlier hunting equipments. When all these factors are borne in mind – and due 
allowance is made for the patrimony of shooting skills that the Luvale are likely to have 
accumulated through sheer practice – it is easier to understand why the lazarinas 
became a crucial tool of production around the headwaters of the Zambesi – one whose 
extensive deployment would have a significant environmental impact. 
To be sure, when describing the situation obtaining among the Lunda of Shinde, 
the Luvale antagonists, Livingstone asserted that ‘their bows and arrows [had] been 
nearly as efficacious in clearing the country of game as firearms’.33 Yet he remained 
convinced that guns did give Luvale hunters a distinctive advantage over the less well-
armed Lunda. In comparison with the Luvale, who ‘enjoy[ed] the privilege of hunting 
on both sides’ of the upper Zambesi, the ‘Balonda [were] able to do little’ – he 
remarked in July 1855, when he also noted that the Lunda-controlled left bank was still 
richer in game than the right one, which had been ‘much hunted by the Balobale who 
have guns’.34 Without being dismissive of traditional elephant hunting techniques, the 
skills demanded by which he had had the chance to admire in Linyati,
35
 Livingstone 
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was also in no doubt as to the ultimate consequences of the diffusion of firearms for 
elephant herds. The Kololo had only just begun to hunt elephants with guns, he wrote in 
1853; if they continued, ‘very soon none will appear in this part of the country. They 
retire before the gun sooner than any other animal.’36 Indeed, environmental 
degeneration was rapid among the gun-rich Luvale, for it was at about this time that the 
middle Luena seems to have exhausted its ivory supplies. Thereafter, whatever little 
ivory the Luvale continued to export alongside slaves and beeswax came mainly from 
newly conquered Lunda territory.
37
 
Hunting and warfare have been described as ‘intimately connected’ activities, 
not least because ‘the hunt is often the training ground for war’ and ‘shooting skills that 
developed in one setting could be transferred to the other.’38  Livingstone might well 
have subscribed to this view, for, contra much recent scholarly literature, he never 
questioned the military significance of firearms, going so far as theorizing that, by 
making local conflicts ‘more terrible’, and by reducing the gap between ‘the strong and 
the brave’, on the one hand, and ‘the weak & cautious’, on the other, guns would work 
towards reducing the incidence of war in Central Africa.
39
 The available written sources 
do not permit to gauge the extent to which the lazarinas affected Luvale tactics and 
organization. On the basis of oral evidence alone, Papstein concluded that warfare on 
the upper Zambesi remained the affair of small bands of marauders bent on taking the 
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enemy by surprise. But even if one accepts this hypothesis (and the unsubstantiated 
contention that the gun was more often used in war ‘as a blunderbuss rather than as a 
precision instrument’40), there is no doubt that the wide availability of firearms 
increased Luvale military potential. This is borne out by their reported ability to repel a 
Kololo party in the 1840s,
41
 and, especially, by their successes during the nineteenth-
century phase of the so-called Wars of Ulamba, in the course of which gun-wielding 
Luvale slave raiders attacked – and gradually encroached upon – the territories of the 
Lunda of Shinde to the east of the Luena and the southern Lunda of Katema, Kapenda 
and others to the north-east.
42
 By the time of Livingstone’s passage in the 1850s, the 
Lunda of Shinde had been in touch with Ovimbundu traders for almost as long as their 
Luvale enemies.
43
 Yet, for reasons that remain unclear, they had been less successful in 
modernizing their armament, and their best responses to Luvale aggression were to beef 
up their ranks by absorbing fleeing Luvale refugees and to strengthen the defences 
around their villages and even individual households.
44
 
By ca. 1870, guns had fully permeated Luvale society, changing it and being 
changed by it. In 1875, the small party of armed Luvale hunters whom Cameron met to 
the north of Nana Kandundu, the Nyakatoros’ new capital in former Lunda territory, 
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were very intrigued by the explorer’s breech-loading rifle. But even though they 
examined it ‘with much admiration’, ‘they did not consider it sufficiently long, their 
own weapons being lengthy Portuguese flint-locks.’ It took a practical demonstration of 
the rifle’s penetrative power and accuracy to dispel the hunters’ knowing scepticism45 – 
one that distinguished them sharply from the gun-poor Kololo, who, as we have seen, 
placed a blind trust in Chapman and other foreign ‘experts’ in the new technology. Not 
only did the Luvale continue to pose a threat to Mambari caravans and other travellers 
plying the increasingly important trade route between Angola and Katanga,
46
 but their 
gun-driven prowess in hunting and warfare also nurtured a strong, gendered martial 
ethos. This was much in evidence in 1895, at the time of Coillard’s visit to Kakenge, 
then living very close to the spot where Livingstone’s Shinde had resided some forty 
years earlier. On the day that preceded his first meeting with the chief, the missionary 
and his Lozi escort were made the target of repeated hostile demonstrations on the part 
of ‘young men all armed with guns’. After a tense night punctuated by war dances and 
continuous discharges of firearms, Coillard was finally brought to the presence of 
Kakenge. ‘The place was full of men, decked in their war-paint, and surrounded by 
bundles of guns.’ The menacing atmosphere eased a little on the following day, but 
Kakenge still warned Coillard not to ‘“take the Balubale for women.”’47 The link 
between guns and masculinity among Luvale hunters and raiders was confirmed a few 
years after Coillard’s passage, when a British official explicitly reported that it was 
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‘unusual and so rare an occurrence to see a man without a gun [at Kakenge’s], as it 
[was] to encounter a woman without her infant.’48  
 
Guns and royal power among the Lozi 
As the Luvale consolidated their gun-centred social system, Barotseland, free from 
Kololo overrule since 1864, was undergoing a dramatic transformation. By means of 
enhanced contacts with ivory traders and hunters from the west and the south, Sipopa, 
the restored Lozi Litunga, had embarked on a programme of accelerated military 
overhaul with a view to consolidating his still fragile internal position.
49
 By the mid-
1870s, Barotseland’s firepower had increased exponentially. Having spent several 
months in Sesheke in 1875, the Czech explorer Holub hazarded an estimate of ‘the 
number of guns that had been introduced into the country from the south and west’ over 
the course of the previous few years. This – he believed – ‘amounted to 500 flint 
muskets, 1,500 ordinary percussion muskets, eighty percussion elephant-guns, 150 
rifles, thirty double-barrelled guns of various sorts, ten breech-loaders, and three 
revolvers.’50 Thanks also to the more advanced and specialized firearms that the 
southern traders were importing into the country alongside older models, the Lozi, 
unlike the Kololo, were now routinely hunting elephant with guns, though they still 
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used them in tandem with locally-produced iron ‘elephant assegai[s]’.51 During the great 
hunt of 1875, as many as ‘10,000 shots’ were said to have been fired in the general 
mêlée that followed Sipopa’s ill-timed first shot.52 Before long the fauna of Barotseland 
– just like that of the Luvale heartland a few decades earlier – began to show signs of 
exhaustion.
53
 By the mid-1880s, Lubosi Lewanika, the Lozi king since 1878, was 
clearly concerned by the environmental consequences of the widespread adoption of 
firearms in hunting. It was probably for this reason that, in 1886, he forbade the use of 
guns during the annual royal hunt.
54
  
Lozi rulers drew on a tradition of political and economic centralization that set 
them apart from the more fragmented Luvale chieftainships to the north. It is therefore 
not surprising that, unlike the latter, the former always did their best to exert a close 
control over the kingdom’s external trade and the movement of firearms that came in its 
wake. Not only did Sipopa resolve to spend most of his time in Sesheke, to the south of 
the floodplain proper, with a view to being closer to Westbeech and other traders from 
the south,
55
 but his monopolistic ambitions also led him to forbid most kinds of 
exchanges between his subjects and visiting merchants.
56
 Ivory, which Sipopa 
accumulated through the payment of tribute or by sponsoring the activities of hunters, 
                                                          
51
 Ibid., II, 339-40. 
52
 Ibid., II, 244-45, 256-57. 
53
 E. Holub, Emil Holub’s Travels North of the Zambezi, 1885-6 (Lusaka, 1975; 1st ed., Vienna, 1890), 
272-73. 
54
 G. Westbeech, ‘The Diary of George Westbeech’, in E.C. Tabler (ed.), Trade and Travel in Early 
Barotseland (London, 1963), 92. 
55
 Holub, Seven Years, II, 134; Arnot, Garenganze, 90. 
56
 See, e.g., Holub, Seven Years, II, 125. 
18 
 
was considered ‘crown-property, and it [was] a capital offence for anyone to carry on 
any transactions with regards to [it] on his own account.’57 The trade in guns was 
another exclusive royal prerogative.
58
 Distribution, too, was closely monitored. Unlike 
other products, Holub was told, firearms were never permanently given away by 
Sipopa, but only ‘lent’ to hunters, chiefs and subjects with the proviso that they could 
‘be recalled at any moment at the royal pleasure.’59 So prominent were firearms in the 
entourage of Sipopa that the same eyewitness was led to believe that the second most 
important ‘officer of state’ in the Lozi kingdom was ‘Masangu’, the ‘governor of the 
arsenal’, whose principal responsibility was the ‘supervision of the ammunition and 
guns distributed to the vassals’. ‘He was likewise superintendent of all the native 
smiths. I found him employed in repairing a gun, for which he was using hammers, 
chisels, pincers, and bellows, all of his own making, and of the most perfect 
construction that I had yet seen in South Africa.’60 This competence, of course, was a 
recent development in Barotseland, and it attests powerfully, not only to the 
increasingly significant role of firearms in the region’s political and economic life, but 
also to the effectiveness with which Central Africans were learning to overcome some 
of the new technology’s limitations by honing pre-existing iron-working skills. There is, 
indeed, some evidence that Sipopa was closely associated with firearms in the minds of 
his people: when the king was ousted in 1876, one of the rebels’ first actions was to 
throw ‘the great bulk’ of his guns into the Zambesi.61  
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Lubosi Lewanika, who wrested the kingship from Mwanawina, Sipopa’s 
successor, in 1878, started off with comparatively few guns, as evidenced by his attempt   
to requisition all the arms and powder in the possession of Serpa Pinto, who visited the 
royal capital of Lealui in August-September of the same year.
62
 However, by the time 
he raided the cattle-rich Mashukulumbwe or Ila in 1882, Lewanika had certainly 
obtained some guns, for the exploits of the ‘“weapon with the lightning”’ made a huge 
impression on its victims.
63
 Lewanika’s trading policies mirrored Sipopa’s. In June 
1886, Holub, on his second trip to the north of the Zambesi, became acquainted with 
‘Liomba’, the ‘trade minister’ whom Lewanika had sent to intercept Westbeech at the 
Kazungula ferry and make ‘all the purchases for the royal household as well as to 
purchase all arms for the empire on the king’s account’.64 A few months later, Watson, 
one of Westbeech’s partners, bought some ivory from the headman of Sesheke. Both 
parties were aware of committing ‘a capital crime [...] since all ivory is private property 
of the king, which he uses, in turn, to buy arms and ammunition for all his subjects.’65 
And firearms Lewanika did continue to buy throughout the late 1880s, for Coillard was 
‘astonished’ by the number of guns available to the Lozi at the time of their second raid 
against the gun-poor Ila early in 1888. Even though he thought the assegai was ‘still the 
national weapon’, the missionary could not help noticing that the Lozi now had arms of 
‘every calibre. To be sure, they are not the most modern pattern; the majority are flint-
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lock. Never mind, they are guns! And to a Morotsi the name alone is magic.’66 
Lewanika’s enduring interest in guns – which the Lozi were now undoubtedly 
employing in warfare, alongside hunting – is also attested by Selous, who, in September 
1888, offered the king ‘a very good hammerless shot gun’,67 and by the nature of the 
presents given to him by concession-seekers Ware and Lochner in 1889 and 1890, 




Barotseland’s centralized political system and monarchical tradition shaped the 
social role attributed to firearms in the region. As pointed out above, the Lozi kings’ 
manifest monopolistic tendencies found no equivalent among the Luvale, where 
political and economic power was, as Coillard put it, much more ‘diffused’.69 It follows 
that, on the headwaters of the Zambesi, ordinary villagers participated earnestly in the 
market economy as epitomized by Ovimbundu and Afro-Portuguese caravans, and that 
the trade’s by-products, including firearms, spread well beyond the chiefly strata.70 In 
Barotseland, conversely, access to firearms, powder and ammunitions seems always to 
have been closely dependent on the Litungas’ patronage. Thus, it probably makes sense 
to describe gun use among the Lozi as being more elitist than among the Luvale. 
Among the Lozi, to put it differently, firearms were less an attribute of masculinity than 
a means of political centralization and a symbol of high birth or proximity to the royal 
court. In Barotseland, as a Marxist historian once argued, firearms served mainly to 
                                                          
66 Coillard, Threshold, 300. 
67
 F.C. Selous, Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa (London, 1893), 252. 
68
 Coillard, Threshold, 356, 387; Mainga, Bulozi, 176; and Prins, Hidden Hippopotamus, 220. 
69
 Coillard, Threshold, 604. 
70
 See, e.g., von Oppen, Terms of Trade, 244, 354. 
21 
 
strengthen the ‘coercive apparatus’ of the landowning aristocracy71; among the Luvale, 
they were the common man’s weapons of choice and a critical component of his social 
identity.  
 
A Kaonde currency 
While the cattle-keeping Ila of the middle Kafue river remained lightly armed until the 
end of the century, other groups on the furthest reaches of Mambari commercial 
penetration responded more readily to the new opportunities for investing in military 
modernization. This was a particularly attractive option for people, such as the Kaonde 
of present-day Solwezi and Kasempa districts, whose livelihoods had long depended to 
a considerable extent on hunting.
72
 Near the modern Congolese border, the 
aggressiveness of Msiri’s Yeke must have also contributed to accelerating the process 
of Kaonde rearmament.
73
 The traditions or reminiscences recorded by Melland in the 
early 1920s certainly suggest that some guns were being used in warfare among the 
Kaonde of Kapijimpanga and the neighbouring Lamba of Mulonga and Kalilele in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century.
74
 The evidence is more detailed for southern 
Kaonde groups. Around present-day Kasempa, firearms were relatively uncommon until 
the late 1870s. In 1878 or 1880, when he killed his cousin Kabambala to assume the 
dignity of Kasempa, Jipumpu is said to have had ‘only one muzzle loader’ at his 
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 However, thanks to both his temporary alliance with Yeke raiders and 
partnership with Mambari traders, Jipumpu – who is also remembered as a great 
elephant hunter – must have been able to beef up his arsenal quickly and effectively. For 
between the 1880s and the 1890s he became a minor regional warlord in his own right, 
raiding some Ila communities for slaves, expelling the Nkoya leader Mwene Kahare 
from his capital, and even defeating a large expedition sent by Lewanika in ca. 1897 to 
support Jipumpu’s rival, the fellow Kaonde chief Mubambe Mushima.76 Jipumpu’s 
great victory owed something both to the fact that most of his men were now ‘armed 
with muzzle loaders’ and to the impregnable nature of his stronghold on 
Kamusongolwa’s hill, a high ‘kopje [...] well provided with good deep caves where 
most of the people could entirely hide themselves from being shot.’77  
It was from about this time that the Kaonde – among whom cattle, the key form 
of transferable wealth in the territories to the south and west, could not thrive on 
account of the presence of the tsetse fly – began to conceive of muzzle-loaders ‘as a 
form of currency [...], serving most of the purposes [...] for which other natives use[d] 
cattle or slaves.’78 Gradually, ‘all transactions regarding wives, inheritance, succession, 
compensation, illness, deaths, burials, and initiation ceremonies’ came to entail ‘the 
loaning or passing of guns and powder.’79 It is not clear whether, in using firearms as 
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standards of value for social payments and even everyday transactions, the Kaonde were 
inaugurating an entirely novel system or modernizing an earlier tradition of regulated 
exchanges of hunting weapons. What is certain, however, is that such practice explains 
the extraordinary extent to which the muzzle-loader embedded itself in the Kaonde 
social structure and culture.  
 
 
Gun Running in the Early Twentieth Century 
 
Colonial rule and gun control laws went hand-in-hand in most localities. Not so in 
North-Western Rhodesia, where the unlicensed importation of guns, powder and 
ammunitions was forbidden in 1901,
80
 but where ownership of firearms by Africans 
remained initially unregulated, since the whole of the country was ‘by a fiction [...] 
treated as having been under the suzerainty of and acquired by treaty with Lewanika. 
Consequently the natives of that portion of Northern Rhodesia have benefited in that 
they have been able to obtain firearms without much difficulty.’81 Early local 
experiments in voluntary registration of guns did take place in select North-Western 
Rhodesian localities, such as the Batoka district from 1903.
82
 But these uncoordinated 
initiatives did not amount to a coherent effort at gun licensing or, even less, to an 
attempt at enforcing such near universal African disarmament as that brought about by 
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the unyielding North-Eastern Rhodesia’s ‘Fire-Arms Restricting Regulations (Natives 
and Asiatics)’.83 Game laws were similarly skewed in favour of North-Western 
Rhodesian Africans. Whereas their North-Eastern Rhodesian peers had been expected to 
take out hunting licences from as early as 1900,
84
 Africans comprised within the 
boundaries of North-Western Rhodesia were explicitly exempted from the stipulations 
of the first game preservation regulations to be issued in the country in 1905. Once 
more, this privilege was ‘in accordance with the provisions of the Concession granted 
by King Lewanika Paramount Chief of the Barotse Nation to the British South Africa 
Company dated October 17
th
 1900’.85  
The absence of internal regulations concerning African gun ownership and 
hunting turned gun running from Portuguese West Africa into one of the defining 
features of the early colonial period in North-Western Rhodesia. A number of additional 
factors help explain the substantial proportions assumed by the phenomenon. While the 
demand for captive labour in Angola remained high long after the formal abolition of 
slavery,
86
 Portuguese officials struggled to establish even the barest form of 
administrative control over the sprawling territory that made up the central and eastern 
regions of the colony.
87
 They, moreover, were strongly suspected of having a stake in 
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 which was also fuelled by the seemingly unrestricted importation and 
sale of gunpowder in the country under their charge.
89
 Finally, Ovimbundu and Afro-
Portuguese smuggling activities were greatly facilitated by both the extent of the 
frontier between Angola and North-Western Rhodesia and, especially, the uncertainty 
surrounding its definition until 1905, the year in which the King of Italy was requested 
to adjudicate the long-running boundary dispute between the British and Portuguese 
governments. This meant that throughout the early 1900s Mambari traders could 
continue to operate in North-Western Rhodesia safe in the knowledge that all that was 
required to avoid prosecution and/or the confiscation of their merchandise was to beat a 
quick retreat to such contested border areas as British patrols dared not encroach upon 
for fear of causing a diplomatic incident.
90
  
As in the nineteenth century, Barotseland’s wealth remained a powerful magnet 
for Angolan traders, some of whom were reported to be buying cattle in Lealui in June 
1900 in exchange for ‘gunpowder, arms and calico’.91 Another ‘large caravan [...] from 
Bihe’ made its entry into Bulozi a few days later, prompting the Acting British Resident 
to voice his ‘apprehension’ at ‘the constant increase of the importation of arms and 
                                                          
88
 See, e.g., Gibbons to Director of Military Intelligence, 2 Oct. 1899, and Harding to Secretary (BSAC), 
4 July 1900, both in NAZ, KDE 2/44/1-3. 
89
 Harding to Secretary, 4 July 1900; H. Schomburgk, Wild und wilde in herzen Afrikas (Berlin, 1926; 1
st
 
ed., 1910), 187. 
90
 See, e.g., DC (Lealui) to S. Admin., 4 Feb. 1904, and Ag. S. Admin. to Ag. DC (Lealui), 7 March 1904, 
both in NAZ, NW/A3/24/9. Cf. also L.H. Gann, ‘The End of the Slave Trade in British Central Africa’, 
Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 16 (1954), 49.  
91
 Harding to Secretary (BSAC), 25 June 1900, NAZ, NW/A6/1/1. 
26 
 
ammunition from the West Coast to this country.’92 At first, the impact of the import 
regulations of 1901 was clearly negligible. In 1903, Lewanika – who still used the 
allocation of firearms and, especially, ammunitions as a means to bolster his position 
vis-à-vis an aristocracy who was bearing the brunt of the British South Africa 
Company’s steady encroachment upon many of its former prerogatives93 – was able to 
persuade the administration to order as many as 4,000 Martini and other cartridges for 
distribution among his trusted indunas. The Company acceded to the king’s request, for 
it expected that this ‘very marked concession’ would ‘stop all illegal traffic in powder 
and cartridges.’94 In fact, seemingly condoned by Lewanika,95 gun smuggling remained 
common,
96
 though the boundary award of 1905 finally equipped British officials to deal 
with it more effectively. The ‘half-caste’ trader Ferreira was one of the first traffickers 
to experience the fast-improving boundary-policing capacity of the BSAC in 
Barotseland. First expelled from the district when found in possession of ‘65 guns and a 
large supply of ammunition’ in July 1911, he had his stock (which included 25 
flintlocks) confiscated and his large camp burned down when he was apprehended for a 
second time inside British territory a few months later.
97
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The gradual – and never entirely complete – closing down of Barotseland from 
1905 did not pose insurmountable problems for Mambari gun runners, who were also 
very active in the still almost entirely unpoliced territory to north, where, of course, they 
boasted long-established trading links with the Luvale, whose aggressive militarism and 
masculinity they had contributed to beget over the course of the previous century. 
Among the Luvale of Kakenge and Nyakatoro, the slave trade was still thriving in ca. 
1900, with ‘a gun or 40 or 80 yards of calico’ being ‘the purchase value of an adult 
slave.’98 Rubber exports were also being paid in guns and gunpowder, which Lovale 
men bought ‘far more readily than ordinary trade goods’.99 Undoubtedly many of these 
guns also found their way to the Luvale and Lunda inhabiting what would become the 
Balovale sub-district of Barotseland in 1907-1908. Writing some 45 years after the 
events, Native Commissioner Venning, the first official in charge of Balovale (present-
day Zambezi), still remembered vividly the ‘large numbers of guns’ owned by ‘both the 
Malunda and Malovale’ and the troubles he faced in bringing illegal imports from 
Angola under control. Venning also claimed to have witnessed ‘the last slave raid’ to 
occur in the area.
100
 This may have been so, but there is no doubt that Mambari gun 
runners remained a force to be reckoned with for some more years to come. A large 
trading outpost in a fortified Luvale village, for instance, was discovered in 1911. 
Venning’s successor surmised it must have been ‘established there quite a long time.’101  
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The trade in slaves and guns was also much in evidence in neighbouring 
Mwinilunga, where, again, no administrative work took place until the beginning of 
1908, when the Balunda sub-district of Kasempa district was got off the ground by NC 
Bellis. Mambari dealers had certainly been at work in the area at the end of the 
nineteenth century,
102
 and they continued their frequent visits throughout the 1900s. In 
1904, the then Kanongesha ‘had seven or eight slaves for sale and was expecting the 
arrival of Mambari purchasers.’103 Two years later, Copeman, the Kasempa District 
Commissioner, and an escort of Barotse Native Police travelled to within fifty miles of 
Mwinilunga with a view to intercepting ‘certain Portuguese traders’ who had been 
reported to be ‘trading guns, powder and caps in return for slaves, ivory and rubber’. 
Three ‘stores’ were eventually located at Salimi’s. A ‘large quantity’ of forbidden goods 
was discovered, while the ‘many empty powder canisters which were found in the 
different stores and lying about the camps testified to the large trade which has been 
going on in this commodity.’104  
As has been argued above, the Kaonde of Kasempa had responded 
enthusiastically to the long-distance trade in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
incorporating Mambari-imported guns into their hunting economy and recasting them as 
a form of transferable wealth. By 1901, their area was ‘flooded with guns and 
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ammunitions’105 – a state of affairs which prompted the Company to inaugurate a police 
post at ‘Fort Kasempa’ in 1902.106 In the face of Mambari obduracy, however, the task 
of controlling the district proved far from straightforward. In 1903, Sub Inspector 
Macaulay intercepted and dispersed two Mambari caravans between Kasempa and the 
Congo Free State border.
107
 It was probably on this occasion that he confiscated, inter 
alia, ‘about 50 guns’ and ‘100 bags of gunpowder’.108 One more Mambari camp was 
surprised near the then Mushima’s village at about the same time. In this instance, only 
three guns were destroyed and 14 bags of gunpowder impounded.
109
 One of the 
problems faced by local administrators in dealing with Angolan smugglers was that the 
‘natives will give no information [as to] their whereabouts.’ This was scarcely 
surprising, given that the Mambari were the Kaonde principal suppliers of firearms and 
that, by now, ‘every native ha[d] a gun and a great many [...] two or three in their 
possession.’ It was these same guns, Macaulay surmised, that accounted for the 





The 1922 Proclamation 
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By the early 1910s, Angolan gun runners were everywhere on the retreat. However, 
from the point of view of struggling BSAC territorial officials, the damage had already 
been done. Supplementing the already substantial quantities of firearms that had entered 
North-Western Rhodesia in the course of the nineteenth century, the additional guns 
introduced into the country at the height of smuggling in the 1900s consolidated earlier 
forms of gun usage among Africans and enhanced their potential for resisting, if not 
colonial rule as a whole, at least the normative apparatus that came with it. Especially in 
the gun-rich and thinly occupied North-West, where the early years of colonial rule 
were punctuated by several episodes of gun-related violence involving both Africans 
and Europeans, local administrators came quickly to the conclusion that disarmament 
was an absolute pre-condition for asserting the authority of the colonial state and 
symbolizing that curtailment of African citizenship rights on which the edifice of 
European domination itself was predicated.
111
 
In 1912, the Kasempa DC, Hazell, sought an audience with Administrator 
Wallace in Livingstone, the capital of the newly unified Northern Rhodesia, to 
recommend the urgent need for the immediate disarmament of the district. Both the 
Lunda and the Kaonde of Kasempa, he submitted, ‘are far from being in a proper state 
of control, and [...] this has been brought about [...] by the fact of their ability through 
the possession of firearms to defy and resist authority.’112 Wallace, however, thought 
that Hazell’s scheme – one which envisaged the detention of all chiefs ‘pending 
surrender of such guns and powder as they and their people possess’ and which would 
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require the deployment of at least 400 police
113
 – would merely multiply the chances of 
armed confrontation by requesting the ‘natives [...] to decide without any warning 
whether or not to obey an order for disarmament on the spot’. He thus put forward a 
counter-proposal for the more gradual registration and licensing of firearms.
114
  
In April of the same year, Wallace reiterated his views in a meeting with 
Gladstone, the High Commissioner for South Africa, in Cape Town.
115
 A 
comprehensive ‘Arms and Ammunition Proclamation’ to this effect was drafted. 
Informed by the belief that ‘the inhabitants of the Kasempa and Lunda Districts have 
beyond question far more guns than they ought to’, it gave local BSAC officials ‘full 
power of refusal of a licence’; the expectation was that ‘after the law comes into 
operation every native-owned rifle will become prima facie illegally owned unless a 
licence can be produced.’116 Though falling short of promoting complete African 
disarmament, the proclamation’s obvious objective, as pointed out by the Secretary for 
Native Affairs, was to ‘[hinder], in every legitimate way, the natives of this Territory 
from acquiring additional firearms and fresh supplies of ammunition’.117 However, the 
arrest of Sakutenuka, the district’s most notorious outlaw, in May 1912 and the desire 
not to antagonize local Africans meant the proclamation was cast aside, and the attempt 
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to re-establish a modicum of order in the troubled north-western marches delegated to 
the Collective Punishment Proclamation.
118
  
In 1914 the sale and exchange of modern rifles throughout Northern Rhodesia 
were made conditional upon obtaining the permission of the administration.
119
 But it 
was only the post-WWI Treaty of St. Germain for the Control of the Traffic in Arms 
that brought back to the fore the still unresolved question of the former North-Western 
Rhodesia’s missing gun legislation. After a convoluted legal history that need not retain 
our attention, ‘The Northern Rhodesia Firearms Restriction (Natives) Proclamation 
1922’ was finally gazetted in January 1923.120 Its most important provision stipulated 
that ‘no native shall be entitled to have or possess arms or ammunition in the Territory, 
unless by the written permission of the Administrator’ or authorized district officials.121 
Alongside ‘permits to possess’ – the concession of which was made dependent upon 
payment of a fee of sixpence from the beginning of 1924 – identically priced ‘permits to 
transfer’ were also introduced to regulate gun exchanges.122 
The debate that followed the issuing of the proclamation of 1922 shows that, 
with the disruptions of the early 1910s a full ten years behind them, local officials in the 
North-Western Province and elsewhere were now more willing than their predecessors 
had been to view firearms as more than just a threat to law and order (which they 
undoubtedly were) and to consider the multiple social uses to which muzzle-loaders had 
been put since their introduction in the region in the course of the nineteenth century. 
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Practical troubles in implementing the law were anticipated in the Solwezi sub-district, 
where ‘ten Messengers, unable to read, will have to deal’ with as many as ‘about 4,000’ 
Kaonde gun owners, all of whom were wont to view firearms, not only as fundamental 
hunting tools, but also as an essential lubricant of social relationships. Hall, the 
Kasempa DC, thought that ample time should be given for registering the guns, since 
‘wholesale confiscation’ was initially to be avoided not to ‘seriously antagonize nearly 
the whole population’.123 In light of the ‘extraordinary’ ubiquity of muzzle-loaders 
among the Kaonde, Hall’s NC was even more pessimistic than his superior about the 
licensing exercise’s real prospects of success: ‘I can imagine that an efficient 
registration system in the Kasempa district might easily present a number of problems 
comparable (in a lesser degree of course) to an attempt to register the ownership and 
transfer of sovereigns or half-crowns in the United Kingdom’.124  
Gun-ownership in the Kasempa district – the same official pointed out – was ‘a 
matter requiring greater delicacy of treatment, probably, than in other districts.’125 But 
misgivings were also expressed in Barotseland and Balovale. For instance, Yeta, 
Lewanika’s successor, and a number of his councillors, long accustomed to the 
privilege of ready access to firearms, questioned the need for permits to transfer. ‘When 
we shoot’, they explained to the Resident Magistrate,   
 
we do not shoot for sport nor pleasure, but we do so for sustenance of life. It would, therefore, be difficult 
[...] to obtain permits every time when one wishes to send one of his family to go and shoot game and 









ducks as many gun owners are old people and members of the Khotla [central council] and cannot always 




The adoption of strategies of evasion was foreboded in Balovale. Given that the 
majority of his messengers were illiterate, the sub-district’s NC was certain that 
theoretically illegal temporary transfers of individual permits would become very 
common among Luvale men. ‘[I]f the owner of the gun hands over his permit to possess 
to the person whom he wishes to hunt for him the chances of being discovered would be 
slight.’127 
Despite all of these concerns, the new gun legislation was put into effect. While 
no violent opposition to registration manifested itself, discontent in Kasempa was 
clearly palpable during the law’s ‘difficult’ first year.128 It was probably not 
coincidental that it was in the course of 1923 that the district witnessed the first strong 
patrol by the Northern Rhodesia Police since the beginning of World War One. Having 
followed the course of the Lunga and combed the Jiwundu swamp near Solwezi, the 
police arrested a number of tax-defaulters and seized as many as one hundred 
unregistered guns.
129
 The Kaonde – who clearly feared that registration would in due 
course be followed by the requisition of their most valuable possession – reacted by 
seeking to dodge the Proclamation’s provisions. Much evasion also took place among 
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the Lunda of Balunda or Mwinilunga sub-district, where the registration exercise began 
in September 1923. After one year, permits to possess had been issued for 600 guns, but 
the DC was ‘pretty sure there [were] over 3,000 in that Sdt.’130 
Prosecutions and confiscations for failure to register and obtain the necessary 
licences began in earnest in the Kasempa district in the summer of 1924.
131
 This had the 
unintended immediate effect of bringing registration to a complete halt. Since ‘everyone 
found with an unregistered muzzle loader got two month I[mprisonment] [with] H[ard] 
L[abour] without the option of a fine and the gun was confiscated as well’, the ‘natives 
had no choice but to conceal unregistered guns’.132 After Hall’s successor reverted to ‘a 
more moderate course from the beginning of 1925, 669 new guns were registered’ and 
licensed. To be sure, the end of the exercise was still not in sight. Yet, the new DC 
commented, this was scarcely surprising. After all, it was ‘probably the ambition of 
every male native to own one or more of these guns’, and it was therefore ‘fairly certain 
that many thousands of them must now exist in N.W. Rhodesia.’ In ‘view of the deep 
suspicion with which most natives would at first regard any law which sought to control 
anything they highly prized’, the DC thought the ‘Firearms Proclamation ha[d] been 
carried out as efficiently as could be expected’ and was confident that, ‘provided no 
harsh or repressive measures [were] adopted [...] a fairly complete registration will in 
due course be effected.’133  
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Guns, this article has attempted to show, spread throughout the bulk of North-Western 
Zambia in the course of the nineteenth century. The enthusiasm with which the 
imported technology was taken up by the peoples of the region was in large measure the 
result of their ability successfully to deploy it for a variety of both predictable and 
innovative purposes. Guns had different meanings in different places, and the modalities 
of their appropriation were closely related to local socio-political circumstances. Among 
the Lozi after the Kololo interlude, guns played a central role as symbols of royal power 
and means of political centralization; among Luvale hunters and raiders, they became 
defining features of masculinity; among the Kaonde, firearms probably served both of 
the above purposes, while also being used as a polyvalent form of currency. However, 
throughout the region under discussion, guns never lost their original function of means 
of human destruction and material production, whose inherent shortcomings, the 
evidence suggests, Africans learnt to minimize by drawing creatively on the 
opportunities afforded by the accessible nature of the new technology. The initial 
weakness of the colonial administration meant that this internally differentiated process 
of technological adaptation continued during the early years of the twentieth century, 
being only brought to an end from 1922, when the hitherto unregulated right to possess 
and exchange guns was taken away from the peoples of North-Western Zambia. 
The effects of the Proclamation of 1922 were compounded shortly thereafter by 
its logical sequel: the extension to the bulk of the former North-Western Rhodesia of 
such game laws as had governed African hunting in the eastern part of Northern 
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Rhodesia since the beginning of the century.
134
 The phased imposition of ‘native 
hunting licences’ constituted another major external interference in the lives of 
communities who had relied on game meat as one of their primary sources of animal 
proteins for centuries. The colonial assault on unrestricted hunting and gun ownership in 
North-Western Rhodesia was a long time in the making. But when it did materialize, its 
consequences were momentous, for it marked the beginning of the end of a number of 
gun-based systems of economic and social relationships which had dominated large 
stretches of North-Western Zambia for several decades - systems that previous 
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